Relevance as Social Matrix of Attention in Alfred Schutz by Campo, Enrico
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA, ISSN 2038-3150, vol. 6, n. 12, pp. 117-148, 2015
www.fupress.com/smp – © Firenze University Press DOI: 10.13128/SMP-17852
Relevance as Social Matrix of Attention  
in Alfred Schutz
Enrico Campo
Attention is a critical faculty in contemporary Western societies. What is surprising is the fact that at-
tention has been mainly analyzed as an individual phenomenon. Scientific research that treats attention 
exclusively on the individual level simplifies an enormously complex situation. Instead, according to the 
idea  defended  in this essay, one cannot think of attention and perception without regard for cultural con-
ventions and social norms. This article  therefore proposes  to investigate attention precisely in its social 
dimension. In particular, the specific objective is to highlight the contribution Alfred Schutz’s theory of 
systems of relevance can give to the understanding of the social mechanisms that regulate attention. In 
order to demonstrate the viability of the Schutzian proposal, here are  discussed  some recent perspectives 
that explore the mechanisms of the social regulation of attention. The article will briefly revisit these 
contributions that explicitly investigate intersubjective and collective attention, and will focus especially 
on the proposals of Eviatar Zerubavel and Yves Citton. Then is analyzed the role of attention in the 
theoretical edifice of Schutz, to focus on the relationship between attention and systems of relevance. 
1. Introduction
To affirm that attention is a critical faculty in contemporary Western socie-
ties is by now a truism, almost a banality: in a world where the fundamental 
economic mechanisms essentially operate in real time on a global level; where 
virtually any event can be digitally reproduced and distributed in the network 
and thus become a possible object of experience on the part of anyone who 
can connect to the internet; where we have access to a quantity of information 
and experience that definitely exceeds our individual ability to manage them; 
where an incredible quantity of goods is offered daily to our attention; where 
diagnoses are formulated that certify an attention disorder; where a notice of 
our mobile devices (an email, a message, a call) can always reclaim our atten-
tion; in a world configured thusly, we can say that our ability to pay attention 
to certain stimuli (objects, human beings, events, actions) rather than others 
that are potentially accessible is in fact fundamental.
Yet, beyond this specific historical juncture, we should note how attention 
is still pervasive in our individual and collective life. To realize this ourselves 
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just think about the fact that every act of our mental life and all our actions are 
somehow attentionally modulated. Attention is pervasive, a sort of “basso con-
tinuo” of human activity (Depraz 2004: 12). It is not a coincidence then that 
attention has been an object of study central to Western thought. To outline the 
overall history of attention as a topic for analysis in Western civilization would 
imply reconstruction of the traces of a millennial path. What is amazing, how-
ever, is the fact that attention has been mainly analyzed as an individual phe-
nomenon (Desideri 2011: 49). Traditionally interest has mainly been directed 
at the means by which a subject (often male, Western and adult) directs atten-
tion to this or that object, to the number of simultaneous objects or operations 
to which he can simultaneously pay attention and so on. The idea that atten-
tion is separate from culture is based on a fictitious conflict between nature and 
culture, and thus a kind of bifurcation between the natural world (pre-cultural, 
of which have access through perception) and the cultural world, which instead 
is bound by our cultural conventions. Instead according to the definition that 
we want to defend in this essay one cannot think of attention and perception 
without regard for cultural conventions and social norms (Parsons 1988).
In this article, however, I propose to investigate attention precisely in its so-
cial dimension. I am convinced that attention should be understood primarily 
as a cultural and social phenomenon in order to try to grasp, at least in part, 
its complexity. Although Alfred Schutz analyzes the problem of attention and 
of relevance from an isolated subject, the social is still inherently present. In 
particular, the specific objective of this paper is to highlight the contribution 
the theory of systems of relevance of Alfred Schutz can give to the under-
standing of the social mechanisms that regulate attention. In the first section 
we will try to return briefly to the different definitions that one can follow in 
order to study intersubjective and social attention. In order to demonstrate the 
viability of the Schutzian proposal, we will discuss some recent perspectives 
that explore the mechanisms of the social regulation of attention. In particu-
lar, we will devote more space to the contributions of Eviatar Zerubavel and 
Yves Citton that, from very different perspectives, analyzed attention as a 
collective phenomenon. In the next section, we will recall Schutz’s theory of 
systems of relevance. Finally, we will attempt to identify within this theory 
some theoretical elements useful for clarifying the nature of social attention.
2. Attention as a social phenomenon
We have just said that, unlike most studies on the subject, we want to inves-
tigate attention as an eminently social phenomenon. Scientific research that 
treats attention exclusively on the individual level simplifies an enormously 
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complex situation. As a first step to better define our field of inquiry we ana-
lytically distinguish three different levels. At the first level attention detects in 
so far as aggregate attention of several subjects on a single object, or as col-
lective attention turned towards an object. The second level is that in which 
the purely intersubjective dimension emerges: my attention is driven by an-
other actually present subject with whom I share the same attentional scene. 
Finally, we can analyze attention, even at the individual level, as disposition 
anchored in a social context that then poses norms, constraints and the poten-
tiality to individual attention. The three levels are, of course, interrelated and 
interdependent; the boundaries are also not as clear as we have presented. In 
any case, we, through Schutz, will be interested primarily in the third. Yet, 
precisely because of this interdependence, we cannot help but revisit the oth-
ers, albeit very briefly.
2.1 The collective attention
The first level, that of collective attention, is probably the most investigated 
in sociology. Here, the interest is pinned on those events that have the abil-
ity to channel the attention of a large amount of subjects. In societies such as 
ours, whose dominant sectors potentially work in real time, one could give 
many examples. We can think of the constant and cyclical repetition of me-
dia events followed worldwide: the Olympics, the World Cup, Oscar night. 
Or even unique events that mark the memory and collective representations 
of entire generations: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the attack on the twin tow-
ers, and so on. Or finally, the fact that the very functioning of the means of 
mass communication is based on measuring the amount of collective atten-
tion (share) that the public grants to media products. That of the mass me-
dia, however, is merely one example, certainly macroscopic, of how certain 
events are able to capture the attention of various subjects and thus mark also 
their representations and collective memory. At this level, the fundamental 
question concerns the study of the mechanisms of construction of collective 
relevance and the identification of social groups that are able to control their 
operation. No wonder then that today the interest of research on collective at-
tention focuses mainly on the media and their ability to determine the politics 
of attention ( Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
2.2 Joint attention
At the level that we called intersubjective, attention is studied with respect to 
an interaction between individuals actually present. In psychology the ex-
pression joint attention is used to indicate an interactive situation in which 
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the adult and the child coordinate their attention on a third object. The 
child’s ability to follow the direction and focus of attention of the adult de-
velops around the age of nine months. In other words the child begins to 
follow the gaze of the adult and focus their attention on a common ele-
ment. At this stage, the interactions between the child and the adult pass 
more and more from a dyadic to a triadic structure, in which the child must 
learn to coordinate its attention and action with the attention and action of 
its partner in the interaction (Moore and Dunham 1995). Around the first 
year of age, children begin to use deictic gestures, the prototype of which is 
pointing. Despite its apparent simplicity, the deictic gesture has great com-
municative power (Tomasello 2008). Joint attention is therefore based on 
the child’s ability to coordinate its attention and action on the object and on 
the adults. In turn the other coordinates its attention and action on the child 
and the object. Already at this level therefore, a first form of cooperative 
communication of a prelinguistic nature is achieved. The child, in a situ-
ation of shared attention, can understand and act in the world along with 
and through others. We can then start to give more validity to the claim that 
attention can be read as a social phenomenon: already at this level in fact, 
“How I perceive the world, and what salience I find there, – writes Shaun Gallagher 
– are to some extent put in place by the gaze and the action of the others. My action with 
respect to the world, and with respect to the others, emerges in the context set by those 
other” (Gallagher 2010: 116 emphasis added). Consequently, the attention of 
others structures both the perception of the world and the salience of objects 
present in it. It is therefore through the attention of others that I can identify 
which elements are most important in my perceptual field. It is precisely for 
this reason, that attention must be investigated even in its contextual dimen-
sion. The interaction that occurs between child and adult is placed in a very 
complex network of social relations. If we expand the breadth of the context 
of interest, we move to the last level we identified previously. Let’s move on 
then to analyze the social matrix of attention.
2.3 The social matrix of attention
The contributions that we propose to place in this category investigate the 
social conditions of exercising attention. The premise behind this approach 
is that attention is exercised on the basis of social norms shared socially in a 
socially structured context. The aim of this essay is, we said, to highlight the 
contribution that Schutz’s theory of systems of relevance can give to the un-
derstanding of attention as a social phenomenon. We’ve already anticipated 
that, before turning to a discussion of this theory, we will revisit two recent 
theoretical proposals that precisely analyze attention from its social structure. 
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The first is that of Eviatar Zerubavel who continues under the banner of cog-
nitive sociology1; the second perspective that we propose to revisit is instead 
that of the Ecologie de l’attention as expressed in a recent book by Yves Citton 
(Citton 2014).
2.3.1 Cognitive Sociology
The proposal of Zerubavel is to analyze attention within a sociology of think-
ing that elects as its object of privileged investigation that which pertains to 
sociomental. According to this perspective, our cognitive faculties depend not 
only on their biological configuration. Nor would it be correct to analyze 
them solely on the basis of the specific individual. The scope of research is 
thus distinct from that of cognitive individualism, based on the idea of  the 
isolated individual whose thoughts could not be other than the product of 
his/her own personal experiences. But it is also distinguished from cognitive 
universalism, the dominant perspective in modern cognitive science. These 
in fact assume a “universal, human mind” and are dedicated to researching 
“the universal foundations of human cognition” (Zerubavel 1997: 3). Instead, 
according to cognitive sociology, it is possible to analyze our cognitive facul-
ties through a different formulation. Zerubavel distinguishes three different 
levels of analysis in light of the fact that “we think both (a) as individuals, (b) 
as social beings, and (c) as human beings” (Zerubavel 1997: 5). Obviously, 
cognitive sociology focuses on the second of these levels, the sociomental to be 
precise, to demonstrate “the social fondation of cognition in general” (Zerubavel 
1997: 116 emphasis added). That is, we live in Social Mindscapes, to borrow 
the title of the book-manifesto of this approach, that have a historical and 
conventional nature. 
The idea that there might exist an isolated individual is rejected in favor 
of the thesis that our cognitive faculties are hinged in a network of social rela-
tions that substantiate and make them possible. With respect to attention, this 
means that the image of the subject who directs his attention guided solely by 
his own will is incomplete and misleading: our attention is guided by rules 
that govern it. The study of attention within this perspective thus aims to em-
phasize the great cultural variability of the ways in which we manage our at-
tention. That is attention is drawn by certain objects, rather than others, also 
because we have been socialized to certain norms of attending. As Zerubavel 
wrote in a brief essay in 1993, “it is unmistakably social ‘rules of irrelevance’ 
1  However the term is to be understood in a different sense from that which is attributed to 
Cicourel in Cognitive sociology (Cicourel 1974).
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that make us perceive certain parts of social situations as mere background 
that can be practically ignored. Separating the relevant from the irrelevant is 
not a spontaneous individual act but, rather, a normative social act” (Zerubavel 
1993: 401). The selection of the perceptual field, in which we operate through 
attention, is therefore driven not only by universal laws of human perception, 
but also by purely social norms (Zerubavel 1993: 398). Attention as “social 
gate of conscioussness”(Zerubavel 1997: 35–52), determines what goes into the 
consciousness: a significant part of that which we perceive is guided by social 
norms of relevance and irrelevance.2 There are therefore social norms of fo-
cusing that guide the determination of that which is not worthy of attention, 
but also that which should be explicitly ignored. That is we can identify the 
rules that guide our attention, but also social norms that invite us to deliber-
ately ignore things that we actually notice (Zerubavel 2006).
The recent Hidden in Plain Sight (Zerubavel 2015) is dedicated to increasing the 
issues raised in previous studies with regard to attention. In this text, attention is 
investigated departing from a metaphor that Zerubavel had already introduced 
in previous studies: “Attending something in a focused manner – he writes in Social 
Mindscape – entails mentally disengaging it (as a ‘figure’) from its surrounding 
‘ground’, which we essentially ignore” (Zerubavel 1997: 35). Zerubavel therefore 
revisits the theory of the perception of Gestalt for the study of attention precisely 
because that which is recognized as a “figure” corresponds to the part of the 
world to which we pay attention, while “the background” is the unattended part 
of our world. The application of the figures-and-background model of percep-
tion is by Zerubavel extended far beyond the visual perception: “to non-visual 
(auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile) forms of perception as well as to altogether 
non-sensory modes of cognition” (Zerubavel 2015: 7). Unlike the Gestalt theo-
rists however, Zerubavel emphasizes the conventional nature of that which we 
identify as figure or as background: nothing is intrinsically figure (and therefore 
relevant) or background (and therefore irrelevant). We distinguish that which is 
figure or background as our attention is socially “deliniated” (Zerubavel 2015: 
8). That is we learn where to direct our attention through attentional socializa-
tion. Attentional socialization that is also revealed in the learning of a language 
(Zerubavel 2015: 63-65). The words somehow prestructure our perception as 
they provide a grid of relevance to our field of perception.
It is possible to study the conventional nature of attention through a sur-
vey of our socio-attentional patterns, or models of management of attention 
that are shared by some groups of subjects but not others. Attentional pat-
2  Zerubavel here makes explicit reference not only to Bateson and Goffman (with whom he 
studied at the University of  Pennsylvania) but also to Schutz.
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terns vary both in time and between cultures or within the same culture. 
Western culture, for example, stimulates a perception of objects of the “field 
independence” type, that is which tend to focus on objects in their individual-
ity as separate from the context in which they are inserted: “this remarkably 
distinctive feature of Western civilization is in fact a product of its emphasis 
on independence. Indeed, cultures that promote social interdependence tend 
to adopt a somewhat less-focused attentional style than those promoting so-
cial independence” (Zerubavel 2015: 54-55). According to this hypothesis, 
therefore, Westerners would be more likely to let emerge individual specificity 
as a figure and to relegate the background the relationships that connect the 
object to its environment. Conversely, for Easterners these relationships rep-
resent the figure of their perceptual field.
2.3.2 Ecology of Attention
The other approach we briefly revisit here is of Yves Citton. Despite the theo-
retical reference points of Yves Citton and Eviatar Zerubavel being very dif-
ferent, they both share a distance from the paradigm that confines attention 
exclusively to the scope of the individual. According to Yves Citton, the first 
operation to be accomplished to bring the analysis of attention out from an 
individualist paradigm is to place it on a historical level. Looking at attention 
from a historical point of view offers at least two important advantages. On 
the one hand, it shows the different ways of standardization of attention in 
different historical periods, and on the other it makes it possible to identify 
periods in which the management of attention becomes a real social problem 
(Crary 2001). The second theoretical operation consists of inverting the indi-
vidualist paradigm of attention, the order in which attention is traditionally 
thought about, in common sense as well as in the traditional sciences. If in 
fact we follow an individualist perspective, the starting point is the individual 
attention. Collective attention is nothing more than a mere aggregate of in-
dividual phenomenon, the sum of individual acts. Yves Citton sets us out to 
follow the opposite path, or to read attention as “an essentially collective phenom-
enon: I’ am careful about that to which we collectively pay attention” (Citton 
2014: 39 emphasis added). Therefore, according to the ecology of attention to 
also understand individual attention we must always take into consideration 
the ecological context in which individuals are placed. Attention, as a subjec-
tive act, is to be framed within collective “attentional regimes” that guide, 
bind and manage the ways in which individuals pay attention.3 According 
3  For this concept Citton refers to the work of  Dominique Boullier (Boullier 2009).
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to this ecological approach, attention is a fundamental mechanism for the 
adaptation of the organism to the environment. In this key, the relatedness of 
attention is to be emphasized above all: it is primarily an interaction (Citton 
2014: 45). According to Citton, collective attention must be considered a pri-
ority over that of the individual: “The attention I pay to what surrounds me 
and that which I encounter is sentenced, at least initially, to follow the routes 
pioneered by the images and discourses that circulate around us and in us. [...] 
Through me, it’s always us / nous who pay attention” (Citton 2014: 55). An affirma-
tion that perhaps is more evident today, if we think about the fact that we live 
in an environment of intense media coverage: according to Yves Citton, it is 
difficult for us to escape the representations conveyed by the media and thus 
to the structuring of relevance they build.
Attention should therefore be understood in relation to its operation in the 
social environment. Thus one of the first characteristics that emerges is the fact 
that my attention is magnetically attracted by the objects to which others direct 
their attention. Precisely because of the importance of attention with respect to 
our survival, it should not be surprising that we, as social beings, tend to notice 
that to which others pay attention. A principle which probably has its ontoge-
netic origin in the development of joint attention, which we briefly discussed 
above, and that today arrives at its maximum evidence thanks to the means 
of mass communication.4 Somehow for us it is important to pay attention to 
that which others pay attention. Yves Citton proposes the formulation of the 
principle of selective collectivization: attention has a dual function; on the one 
hand it ensures a functional adaptation to the environment through a pre-selection of what 
interests us, and on the other it simultaneously makes sure that there is a kind of 
automatic collective composition of individual desires (Citton 2014: 59). Obvi-
ously, here Yves Citton doesn’t aboslutely allude to some sort of harmonization 
of interests, but rather to the fact that through a spontaneous alignment of our 
individual attention to that of others, we share the same systems of relevance, 
to use a Schutzian term that we will discuss better in the next section.
For Zerubavel and also for Citton, perception is anchored in selection 
mechanisms that have their origin at the collective level. Our attention is 
therefore guided by networks of salience that are the precipitate of knowledge 
accumulated by previous generations. These clichés, operate as sensory filters 
that allow us to quickly select the relevant elements from our environment. 
“These clichés – writes Yves Citton – provide the basic tools that our ‘auto-
4  We note, only in passing, that the approach of  Yves Citton hollows out the apocalyptic criti-
cism of  the media as weapons of  mass distraction, while collecting the critical scope. The 
incredible “gregariousness” produced by the media is based on the same mechanisms that are 
constitutive of  our subjectivity.
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matic’ attention needs to quickly identify the objects around us as sources of 
pleasure or danger” (Citton 2014: 63). However, these clichés are not static 
selection tools that we inherit and simply use as they have been transmitted. 
Rather, we put them to the test regularly and then help to reproduce and 
modify them. If, for the principle of transindividual attention, I can pay atten-
tion to something only to the extent that we pay attention, it is because “this 
mutual fund of clichés in perpetual re-elaboration conditions my ability to 
identify phenomena that I meet in my environment” (Citton 2014: 65).
Let us now turn to the analysis of systems of relevance in Schutz. During 
our exposition, we will see how different points of contact exist between the 
approaches just mentioned and Schutz’s analysis of attention.
3. Attention and relevance
3.1 The function and role of attention in Alfred Schutz
Despite the fact that Schutz does not devote a systematic study to attention, it 
is still a central and recurring theme in his work. It is possible to try to identify 
three broad thematic areas in which attention emerges as an essential compo-
nent of the argument addressed.5 A first problem area, in which Schutz makes 
reference to attention, concerns the analysis of the tension of consciousness, 
of attention à la vie and the study of the constitution of meaning. The theme of 
attention then returns in the analysis of the transition from finite provinces 
of meaning and of the structure of consciousness. Finally, and this is the area 
that interests us most, attention is analyzed in the light of the system of rel-
evance. Before we turn to the central theme of this essay, namely the relation-
ship between attention and relevance, it would be good to touch briefly on the 
first two areas mentioned above.
As noted, in the first phase of his theoretical production, Schutz attempts 
to provide a more solid philosophical foundation for the comprehensive soci-
ology of Max Weber. According to Schutz in fact, some theoretical concepts 
fundamental to the Weberian framework remain unexplained and need to be 
further examined. The same notions of comprehension (Verstehen) and mean-
ing subjectively understood remain insufficiently investigated and Schutz ap-
proaches the phenomenology precisely to overcome these limitations of We-
5  This first schematic does not intend or claim to be exhaustive: precisely because of  what we 
already called pervasiveness of  the concept of  attention it is probably possible to identify areas 
other than those proposed by myself.
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ber’s thought. The only book published while Schutz was alive, Der sinnhafte 
Aufbau der Sozialen Welt, was driven precisely with this intent (Schutz 1967). 
At first however, Schutz believed he could tap into the thinking of Henry 
Bergson to provide an adequate theoretical foundation to comprehensive so-
ciology.6 So despite the fact that the framework of the 1932 volume was clearly 
phenomenological, the influence of Bergson is still visible, even if the concepts 
derived from the French philosopher are implanted in an entirely different 
structure. Then with time, the weight of Bergson in the overall economy of 
the Schutzian theoretical system became significantly reduced (Protti 1995: 
47-73). From Bergson Schutz revisits the dual structure of the levels of con-
sciousness: that of durée and that of spatialized and uniform time. In the durée 
experiences connect to each other in a continuous flow, from a now to another 
now, in a purely qualitative flow. The stream of consciousness in durée is nec-
essarily irreflexive: the conceptual reflection instead pertains to spatialized 
time and the work of “cuts” in this continuous flow of itself: “In everyday life 
the Ego, as it acts and thinks, lives on the level of consciousness of the space-
time world. Its “attention to life” (attention à la vie) prevents it from becoming 
submerged in the intuition of pure duration” (Schutz 1967: 47). Attention to 
life then, indicates the degree of interest in encountering reality, to face it, 
and therefore it is the principle that governs our power of consciousness. The 
highest level of attention to life corresponds to the plan of action in which 
the interest in encountering reality is maximum (Schutz 1945). Since the first 
early works, Schutz is interested in the concept of attention to life in order to 
emphasize the selective function: the subject acts in a world that preys upon 
him, that somehow imposes itself on him, and attention to life permits one to 
select and isolate certain objects of a perceptual field that otherwise would be 
potentially unlimited (Wagner 1977: 193-194).
Consequently, it is necessary that attention to life is relaxed so one can 
reflexively grasp the flow of consciousness. That it is possible to become aware 
of an experience only by turning our gaze in the direction opposite the flow. 
At this point, Schutz basically follows the analysis of Husserl on the turning 
of attention (Zuwendung). 7 It is that act of attention to an experience already 
6  Three manuscripts testify of  this early attempt: Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur, Sinnstructuren der 
Sprache and Sinnstructuren der Novelle: Goethe. For an analysis see Wagner H.R. (1977), The Bergso-
nian Period of  Alfred Schutz, in «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», Vol. XXXVIII, 
n. 2, and Id., Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography, Chicago and London, The University of  
Chicago Press, Id. (1983)..
7  As for the extremely complex problem of  attention in Husserl we will refer to the rigorous 
and original works of  Natalie Depraz (Depraz 2004; Depraz 2014) and the interesting consid-
erations that Fabrizio Desideri has dedicated to the subject (Desideri 2011).
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passed that confers to the same experience a new status; experiences are col-
lected, identified, while to simply live in the duration implies a continuous 
transition from one experience to another without them being clearly distin-
guished from each other. To fully understand the importance of attention in 
this context it is good to remember the objective of Schutz. The Austrian soci-
ologist wants to provide a more precise and solid foundation to comprehensive 
sociology, and then, in particular, the problem of meaning. An experience 
becomes significant when it is reflexively collected thanks to the ray of light 
of attention: it is attention to an elapsed experience that allows it to be given 
a meaning: “Only from the point of view of the retrospective glance do there 
exist discrete experiences. Only the already experienced [Erlebte] is meaning-
ful, not that which is being experienced [Erleben]. [...] From the point of view 
of passing experience, the predication of meaning is necessarily trivial, since 
meaning here can only be understood as the attentive gaze directed not at pass-
ing, but at already passed, experience” (Schutz 1967: 52 emphaisi added). 
Consequently, even if meaning can only refer to the predicative scope of con-
sciousness, it is necessarily based on the prepredicative: the act of attention 
reveals an experience that otherwise would remain “unilluminated”.8
As anticipated, a second area of  problems concerns the interrelated themes 
of the passage between provinces and the structure of consciousness. The the-
ory of finite provinces of meaning is fairly well known: Schutz picks up from 
William James the idea that we live in different orders of reality, but he prefers 
to use the term finite provinces of meaning to emphasize that it is the meaning 
of our experiences that delimits a province and not the ontological status of the 
objects. The essay On Multiple Realities, probably one of the best known of his 
theoretical works, explicitly addresses this topic. The provinces in which we live 
are many, Schutz cites the world of dreams, fantasy, art, religious experience, 
scientific contemplation, the games of children and the mentally ill, but the list 
could be enriched further still. The Austrian sociologist indicates that all other 
provinces are modifications of this intersubjective world of everyday reality, the 
paramount reality. The world of everyday life is the province from which we 
start and to which we return. In living a province, we bestow the focus of reality 
and in so doing we relegate the other provinces to the background. The transi-
tion between a province and another comes via a shift, subjectively perceived 
as a shock due to the change in tension of consciousness founded on a different 
attention to life. According to Schutz, at least in this essay, the transition is ex-
perienced subjectively in terms of a trauma. He returns to the theme of the pas-
8  For a detailed analysis of  the characteristics of  attention in Schutz on this theme see Perreau 
2010: 83-84 (Perreau 2010: 83-84)..
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sage explicitly and without significant changes in Symbol, reality and society, and 
implicitly in many other texts. The author explicitly addresses these issues in the 
Introductory Notes to Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, an unfinished volume that 
remained unpublished until 1970, to which we will return in more detail below 
(Schutz 1970). In this text, the image of the shift does not fully satisfy Schutz for 
the fact that, on closer inspection, each activity often involves the commingling 
of more than one province. The same for the essay on relevance, where Schutz 
says it implies the unification of a number of activities each belonging to its own 
specific field. As noted, for Schutz consciousness always has a theme, namely 
that which is the focus of attention, and a horizon, that which is merely coexpe-
rienced together with the theme. The focus here seems to have the function of 
unifying the field of consciousness and thus allows the pre-eminence of a theme: 
even if in the field of perception there are several potential objects to which to 
direct attention “none of these perceived things is at the moment thematic for 
me. My attention is concentrated on a quite specific task (the analysis of the 
problem of relevance), and my present writing under these and those circum-
stances is but one among several means by which I could bring about this goal 
and communicate my thoughts to others” (Schutz 1970: 94). The shifting of the 
focus of reality to a province and the turning of attention toward a particular 
activity seems therefore to be the first instance of determination of the field of 
consciousness that at the same moment allows its unification. The preeminence 
of a theme becomes the element able to bring up a series of activities belonging 
to different provinces as a single activity which confers the focus of reality to 
the prevalent province: “all others receive merely the accent of derived reality – 
namely, they become horizonal, ancillary, subordinate in relation to what is the 
prevailing theme”(Schutz 1970: 98). Although, in fact, the subject confers the fo-
cus of reality to a province, on closer inspection all the other activities involve us 
to varying degrees and so we pay some form of attention to them. Schutz there-
fore concludes the vision of the passage between the provinces through a leap is 
revealed to be “an oversimplifiation” (Schutz 1970: 14): we live simultaneously 
in many provinces. As evidence of the close relationship that ties the theme of 
attention with that of consciousness, Schutz feels the need at this point to make 
two assumptions about subjectivity that take into account the fact that we live 
simultaneously in different provinces. According to the schizophrenic-ego hy-
pothesis we can perform some typical or semiautomatic activities that involve 
only superficial levels of our personality and we can do it even when a particu-
larly moving event has altered the deepest levels of our personality. Although we 
can give our full attention to routine activities, we still haven’t abandoned the 
issue of the deeper level. But not even this metaphor fully satisfies Schutz, who 
aimed to introduce an additional image borrowed from music. The relationship 
that exists between two themes that run simultaneously in the same stream of 
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consciousness is similar to that of the counterpoint: two themes flow simultane-
ously and “listener’s mind” can pay full attention now to one, now to another 
topic, but continues to flow independently.
All these problems are, however, according to Schutz, expressions of a sin-
gle fundamental phenomenon whose analysis brings us precisely to the spe-
cific theme of this essay: “Living simultaneously in various realms of reality, 
in various tensions of consciousness and modes of attention à la vie, in various 
dimensions of time, putting into play different levels of our personality (or dif-
ferent degrees of anonymity and intimacy), the counterpointal articulation of 
the themes and horizons pertaining to each of such levels (including finally the 
schizophrenic patterns of the ego) are all expressions of the single basic phenomenon: 
the interplay of relevance structures” (Schutz 1970: 100-101). The phenomenon of rel-
evance for Schutz is therefore placed at a more radical level than the others. 
Through the concept of relevance he wants to give an account of the methods 
and norms that guide attention. The subject in fact is not completely free to 
direct attention at any object available in his/her perceptive and conceptual 
field, there are limits, conditions, paths that we must follow: “Husserl has inves-
tigated the functions of what he calls the “attentional ray” for the constitution of 
the thematic kernel and therewith for the structurization of the whole field. At 
any moment there are many experiences going on simultaneously. What con-
stitutes one (or better, one strain) of these temporally ongoing and simultaneous 
experiences as the thematic one is the fact that I voluntarily turn to it or reflect 
upon it (and hence this is an ego-activity, insofar as the ego is the source of all 
the activities of my conscious life). Husserl’s description of this activity may lead to the 
misconception that this selection, this choice, may be performed at random within an unlimited 
range of freedom or discretion” (Schutz 1970: 95 emphasis added). The decision to di-
rect one’s attention to certain themes, to focus attention on some objects and to 
relegate others to the background, takes place in a narrow range of discretion. 
These acts of selection, continues Schutz, have their own history and are inter-
connected: modes of relevance are in fact organized into systems. The systems 
of relevance are the “engines” of selective activity (Muzzetto 2006: 164), they 
determine the regulative principles of construction of reality over conscious-
ness and experience of objects, events and relationships (Nasu 2008: 92). The 
systems of relevance are thus the matrices, socially derived and socially condi-
tioned, which guide the attention and therefore the selection of useful elements 
to subjects to define and manage the situation in which they are immersed.
3.2 The Theory of Systems of Relevance
Before addressing in detail the analysis of Schutz’s systems of relevance it is 
appropriate to clarify the role of this concept in the overall theoretical system 
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of the Austrian sociologist. As we just mentioned, the concept of relevance is 
placed at a level of depth that permit us to treat all the other themes which 
have occupied Schutz. If it is certainly true that in light of the systems of 
relevance, attention emerges above all in its operational component (Perreau 
2010), as an essential element for action and reflection in the world of every-
day life. But it is also equally true that one must be cautious in attributing this 
new setting to the influence of the new American intellectual environment 
and in particular to pragmatism. I do not think it is entirely correct to estab-
lish a contrast between a European and an American period. According to 
this approach, in the period before his migration attention is analyzed mainly 
in its active and reflexive dimension, like the spotlight that can illuminate an 
experience. Following his migration, instead attention is detected especially in 
relation to a wholly grounded subject in the world of everyday life. In this sec-
ond moment attention would then be analyzed mainly in the passive dimen-
sion and in relation to its role in the constitution of the world taken for granted.
However, I believe that this change is all inside the original development of 
the phenomenological path of Schutz. A path that has been enriched thanks 
to the contributions of American authors, namely James and Mead, but that 
has maintained a substantial coherence (Luckmann 1973). There definitely 
exists a change of focus or perhaps rather of setting in analyzing the role of at-
tention, but this change should be framed within the complex relationship be-
tween transcendental phenomenology and phenomenology of the natural at-
titude in the thought of Schutz9 and particularly to the gradual self-autonomy 
of analysis of the mundane sphere. The world of everyday life is imposed pro-
gressively more and more as a privileged place of phenomenological analysis 
to the point at which Schutz in last phase of his life saw fit to proceed solely 
on the ground of mundane phenomenology (Letter to Gurvitsch of 22.3.1957 
in Grathoff 1989).
Therefore along this path the life-world in its everyday social dimension 
acquires an increasing role but the fact remains that some problems were well 
presented even before Schutz had reduced the role of transcendental phenom-
enology. Precisely for this reason it is possible to identify different references 
to some central questions of the problem of relevance across the theoretical 
production of Schutz and particularly in the works before emigration. Among 
the questions raised in this period, in fact, some of the issues that Schutz faces 
in the following years are already present in embryonic form. Especially the 
9  The analysis of  this particularly delicate and complex problem certainly can not be devel-
oped here. For a detailed analysis see Wagner (Wagner 1983: 287-328) and Muzzetto (Muz-
zetto 1997: 23-69).
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idea that selective attention can be read in terms of relevance to everyday life; 
a relevance guided by interest. Another manuscript then, that Wagner places 
between 1927 and 1928, is explicitly dedicated to relevance. The text, enti-
tled Relevanz (Schutz 1927), is of utmost importance because it testifies to the 
transition from the Bergson period to that one more strictly phenomenologi-
cal. Here Schutz is very clear in stating how the problem of relevance selects 
from the totality of a pre-existing world, an old problem in philosophy, which 
regards the social sciences, but is of vital importance in everyday life: “The 
concept of relevance is the central concept of sociology and of the cultural 
sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. However, the basic phenomenon of relevance 
reaches beyond them into every life; it permeates our existing, our living and 
cognizing experience” (Schutz 1927: 3). In The Phenomenology of the Social World, 
then, the attentional modifications are analyzed in detail in paragraph 13 in 
relation to the constitution of meaning. And here, we have already said, atten-
tion is studied in relation to reflection and thus regards its active dimension. 
Yet, in the same text, the concept of relevance is revisited multiple times and 
in the concluding section, “A Glance at Further Problems”, Schutz affirms 
that among the issues to be addressed is certainly “the whole problem of relevance, 
which has kept cropping up again and again in the present study. The de-
finitive clarification of this problem will be possible only through an over-all 
phenomenological analysis, which nevertheless can be begun within the field 
of the social sciences” (Schutz 1967: 249). The central role is thus recognized, 
but the systematic treatment is postponed to a later date. Schutz follows this 
same strategy in many other later essays: even when explicitly dealing with 
certain aspects of the problem, he does not fail to specify how in reality it is a 
far more complex issue that deserves more space and a more detailed analysis. 
The Austrian sociologist tries this analysis only in The Problem of Relevance, a 
book that, as we have said, remained unfinished and was published in 1970, 
eleven years after his death. It is unclear why the planned book on relevance 
was not completed. On the other hand, these tormented pages (Protti 2001), 
although provisional and incomplete, represent the main source for studies on 
the concept of relevance in Schutz. Even as the project was abandoned, inter-
est in the issue has not waned. In the following essays, the author continued 
to make reference to the subject and devoted a substantial part of The Structure 
of the Life World to it.
If we look at the overall production of Schutz the problem of relevance 
meets a strange fate. In fact it seems the role of the concept of relevance in 
Schutz is similar to that of attention in Husserl: both are as central as they 
are hidden in the theoretical architecture of the two authors (Depraz 2004: 5; 
Depraz 2014). This is especially true if we look at the work that Schutz pub-
lished while he was still alive: the concept of relevance seems a sort of thread 
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that emerges only partially in published essays until 1959, the year of Schutz’s 
death. Yet, this concept can in fact be considered a sort of base concept of the 
whole concept of the social (Natanson 1986) that, according to Nasu, is pre-
sent in all the works of the Austrian sociologist and that connects them with 
each other (Nasu 2008: 91). So let’s now analyze the systems of relevance, 
particularly in relation to the problem of attention.
3.3 Systems of Relevance
The systems of relevance, we have already said, can be seen as the social 
matrix within which the individual attention operates. These determine both 
the form and the content of our stream of consciousness (Schutz 1945: 213) 
and, as a consequence, indicate what pertains to the situation with which the 
individual must come to terms (Schutz 1950: 284). As Nasu effectively wrote: 
“relevance is a regulative principle of reality construction in the sense that it 
is a regulative principle of knowing and experiencing objects, events, and, in 
turn, the subject, as well as a regulative principle for defining the situation” 
(Nasu 2008: 93). Schutz however does not begin with a general definition of 
the systems of relevance to then investigate the different types. At the outset 
of his study on relevance, the author resumes briefly the theory of percep-
tion as choice of Jankélévitch, that of the problematic possibility of Husserl 
and the theory of choice of Bergson. According to Schutz, however, the more 
complete description of the phenomenon was given by the skeptic Carneades 
with his theory of verisimilitude. The exploration of the theme of relevance, 
is therefore carried out on the basis of the example of Carneades: a man in 
winter enters a dimly lit room and his attention is immediately drawn to an 
object in the corner; the man is undecided: it is a snake or a coil of rope? 
Schutz chooses to frame the attention and relevance from a sample taken 
from an everyday situation. Already this is an indication of the path he wants 
to follow: the attention it is not a theme for his role in the reflection, but as a 
guide for the operation of our systems of exploration and management of the 
situation with which the subject has to come to terms.
In any case, what interests Schutz is that all these authors cited recog-
nize that within the field of consciousness there are a number of objects that 
compete for our attention: “Still, all of these theories – those of Carneades, 
Husserl, Bergson, Jankelevitch – have in common the assumption that with-
in the given field of our consciousness, several configurations (perceptual or 
fancied or otherwise) compete with one another for our interpretive assent. 
They compete in the manner of problematic possibilities or alternatives: each 
has a certain appeal to us, each has its particular weight, each is capable of 
being connected with previous experiences, at least as to the type inherent 
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to them” (Schutz 1970: 105). It is the absence of the problem of the alterna-
tive that Schutz criticizes the Gestaltists: who don’t explain why, among the 
different possible configurations, just this Gestalt configuration is privileged 
over another. Or put another way, every Gestalt already presupposes a choice 
between problematic possibilities, or alternative interpretations of the same 
object of perception. In the form of a question: why among the many objects 
present in my own field of perception does this object catch my eye? And why 
among the many possible alternatives am I undecided between a coil of rope 
and a snake? Obviously Schutz tries to answer these questions with the theory 
of systems of relevance.
3.3.1 Thematic relevance
Schutz identifies three systems of relevance: thematic, interpretative and mo-
tivational. The distinction is purely analytic and proposed for heuristic pur-
poses: in everyday reality the process is completely unified and the boundaries 
between the three systems of relevance are difficult to separate. But on this 
point we will return later; we begin now by addressing the systems individu-
ally. Schutz distinguishes between imposed thematic relevance and intrinsic 
thematic relevance. We see the first characterization that provides us with 
examples of imposed thematic relevance: “This is the first form of relevance: 
namely, that by virtue of which something is constituted as problematic in the 
midst of the unstructuralized field of unproblematic familiarity – and there-
with the field into theme and horizon. We shall call this kind topical relevance. It 
is worthwhile to note parenthetically the fact that the Greek root of the term 
“problem” is equivalent to its meaning to the Latin root of the term “object.” 
The original meaning of both is “that which is thrown before me. [...] to make 
an object a problem, to make it the theme or topic of our thought, means noth-
ing else than to conceive it as a dubious and questionable one, to segregate it 
from the background of unquestionable and unquestioned familiarity which 
is simply taken for granted” (Schutz 1970: 107). That which attracts the atten-
tion of the subject is what breaks the expectations, that is the object that can-
not be brought back automatically to the type of things that, on the basis of 
knowledge sedimented in its own foundation of experience, he expects to find 
in that given environment. The relevancies are imposed because it is the unu-
sual, unfamiliar experience that forces us to pay attention precisely because 
of its strangeness (Schutz 1970: 108). The thematic relevancies imposed thus 
concern the experiences that are not subject to making themes through an act 
of will. Schutz refers not only to unexpected and unfamiliar experiences as 
we’ve just seen, but also to other forms of imposed relevance, like the involun-
tary passages of the province or changes in the level of personality involved. 
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The author does not address in detail the different ways, but they all seem to 
implicate a certain thematic and cognitive discontinuity, or a discontinuity 
between the theme that occupied the consciousness before the onset of a new 
theme unrelated to the former. In fact, in an attempt to identify a general 
characterization of imposed thematic relevance, Schutz writes that “any in-
terruption or modification which necessitates discontinuing the idealizations 
of ‘and so on’ and ‘again and again,’ which are at the root of all our experi-
ence, created imposed topical relevances” (Schutz 1970: 109).
The intrinsic thematic relevancies, however, concern those cases of volun-
tary change of theme and that Schutz explicitly connects to the phenomenon 
known in psychology as voluntary attention. The sociologist distinguishes two 
cases of voluntary displacement of attention: the transition to the new theme 
can be done gradually by expanding or deepening the theme of departure, or 
by the voluntary changing of attention towards a theme that has no connec-
tion with the theme of departure. Especially in the latter case, the distinction 
between imposed and voluntary is thin and appears to relate to the presence 
or absence of motivation. As a result Schutz focuses on the first category and 
is sure to revisit how these remain ideal-typical distinctions: it is not possible 
to find them in concrete reality in their pure form.
The choice of the expression “intrinsic relevance” associated to voluntary 
seems however to want to emphasize that the voluntary nature does not mean 
full discretion. Although Schutz in the text on relevance is not entirely clear 
on this point (remember they are still notes), the two sub-categories identified 
seem to corroborate this hypothesis. We have just seen how they can give two 
cases of voluntary thematic relevance: extension of the theme of departure 
and identification of a new theme. The first case is easily distinguishable from 
imposed relevance that involves a thematic and cognitive discontinuity: the 
extension of the theme is to the contrary characterized by a continuation 
of the theme of departure. In this sense it is an “intrinsic” relevance to the 
theme; this means that an established theme of departure does not have full 
and complete discretion to further thematizations. As for the case of voluntary 
identification of a new theme, the situation is more complex since a disconti-
nuity exists. The latter however, is a limiting case for Schutz (Muzzetto 2006: 
172). The distinction between imposed and intrinsic seems to concern the 
existence of a motivation to change attention. In any case, that which we want 
to emphasize is that the reference of Schutz to motivation serves to clarify 
that also in the case of voluntary attention there exists a direction and limits 
(also these are social in nature). Schutz, on one hand, is reluctant to associate 
voluntary attention to full discretion but, at the same time, tries to safeguard 
subjective autonomy: “by the establishment of the paramount theme as home base both 
the direction of the intrinsic relevances leading into the horizon and the limit up to which 
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they must be followed are to a certain extent already constituted. To be sure a voluntary 
act is needed to perform this translation of horizonal material into topical 
terms, but this freedom is limited” (Schutz 1970: 112).
3.3.2 Interpretative relevance
Once an object has attracted attention it must be interpreted, and it is here 
that interpretative relevance comes into play. For Schutz, to interpret a phe-
nomenon means to bring it back to its typicality under other previous typi-
cal experiences. However not all sedimented experiences are useful in this 
process, but only those relevant to the thematic object for the subject. The 
systems of interpretive relevance thus serve to select those experiences that 
should be revisited for the interpretation of the object, but also which aspects 
of the object are relevant for interpretation: “This kind of relevance reveals, 
however, a curious double function. Not only is it interpretatively relevant that part of our 
stock of knowledge at hand has “something to do” with the thematic object now given to our 
interpretation; but, by a single stroke, certain particular moments of the object perceived 
obtain the character of major or minor interpretative relevance for the task of recognizing and 
interpreting the actually experienced segment of the world.” (Schutz 1970: 113). This op-
eration, of comparison between the percept and the material previously expe-
rienced, is often performed at the prepredicative level, through what Husserl 
calls passive synthesis of recognition. In this way, the percept, which has a certain 
shape range and color, is associated “with the recollection of previous percep-
tions of corporeal objects having typically similar, like, or same shape, exten-
sion, color, and so on” (ibid.). Therefore, most of the processes of interpreta-
tion takes place at this level without the aid of the sphere of judgment. It is on 
this basis that Schutz makes the distinction between imposed interpretative 
relevance and those intrinsic. The imposed relevances are such because they 
remain at the level of passive syntheses: the object is automatically brought 
back to the same objects or those typically similar to ones previously experi-
enced and the knowledge of this object is adequate to come to terms with the 
situation (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 200). Just because it does not reach the 
level of awareness, this relevance is according to Schutz imposed. Therefore, 
most of the objects that do not attract my attention, remain in the background 
because they are automatically led back to the already known. The intrinsic 
relevances come into play when the level to be involved is predicative. If the 
guaranteed automatic interpretation of passive synthesis is not sufficient or is 
not adequate, then it is necessary to resort to voluntarism. It is thus the case of 
the problematic possibility, for which an act of self-will is necessary that the-
matizes intrinsic aspects of the dominant theme. If I therefore should interpret 
an object that caught my attention, I have to voluntarily move my attention to 
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other aspects or objects that are associated with this theme. As for the intrinsic 
thematic relevances, Schutz specifies that even they have limits. To return to 
our example, Schutz says, the man who enters the room is undecided whether 
to interpret the object that attracts his attention as a snake or a rope, but he 
doesn’t ask himself whether the object can be a dog: “The system of interpreta-
tive relevances is founded, in short, upon the principle of compatibility – or, as Leibniz 
would call it, of compossibility – of all of its coexistent moments. And for this very 
reason the volitional acts which supervene in establishing additional intrinsic 
interpretative relevances are limited in scope (not everyone is freely available), 
as are the acts establishing intrinsic topical relevances”(Schutz 1970).
To introduce the motivational relevances, we can mention a theme that 
we will deal with more fully later. Schutz makes reference to interest both 
at the conclusion of the analysis of thematic relevances as well as to that of 
interpretive relevances. We have seen that something is the object of our 
attention and therefore needs to be interpreted by its strangeness, its non-
familiarity. We need to make it familiar. But what determines the level of 
familiarity necessary? In principle it is possible to penetrate indefinitely the 
exterior and interior horizons of a theme. According to Schutz it is “a set 
of current interests” of the subject that determines the degree of familiar-
ity sufficient: that is, it is only based on the interest that we can distinguish 
the portion of the world that needs further investigation and with which we 
want to familiarize ourselves, from that which can be taken for granted and 
therefore remain in the background. In turn however, the current interest “is 
itself a form of relevance” (Schutz 1970: 118) and to its analysis we will dedicate 
the next section. For now it is sufficient to note how the systems cannot be 
treated separately: when Schutz analyzes a system he must necessarily refer 
to the others.
3.3.3 Motivational relevance
Let’s return to the case of problematic possibilities and to our example of 
the man who enters a room and is undecided whether to interpret the object 
that caught his attention as a snake or a rope. If he has no further interpre-
tive elements to establish with a sufficient degree of probability what the ob-
ject in the corner is, he may decide to continue the process of interpretation 
and hit it with a stick. In this way, he would obtain additional interpretative 
material to resolve his dilemma. The man, that is, can not remain in a situa-
tion of doubt because the solution to the dilemma (rope or snake?) is relevant 
to his future conduct. The motivational relevance indicates that “what has 
to be done is motivated by that for which it is to be done, the latter being mo-
tivationally relevant for the former. It is a chain of interrelated motivational 
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relevances which leads to the decision concerning how I must act” (Schutz 
1970: 119-120). However, Schutz warned immediately, this formula is not 
entirely clear: the interpretative decision (to clarify whether it is a snake or 
a rope) motivates the action to hit with the stick; in turn however it is the 
end of this action (to avoid danger) that motivates the interpretive process 
(or the acquisition of other relevant elements of interpretation). There is 
thus an ambiguity that must be clarified between motivating and motivated 
experiences. To this end, Schutz distinguishes between “in order to” and 
“because” motives. The first refers to the planned end of the action, namely 
to the state of things that the subject intends to realize through the action 
taken. The imagined end of the action in turn motivates the single opera-
tions to be done to realize the state of things planned. So in order to remove 
the danger the man has intension to take a stick for striking the object. We 
can express the same concept through a language formula equivalent if, 
instead of asking ourselves at the moment that precedes the action, we look 
at the moment that follows the beginning of the action: the man took the 
stick because of the fact that he wanted to hit the object. These two forms 
are equivalent and thus for Schutz we are still faced with motives such as 
“in order to”: “in both the state of affairs to be brought about, the para-
mount project, motivates the single steps to be taken. In other words, the 
paramount project is motivationally relevant for the projecting of the single 
steps; the single steps to be performed are, however, “causally relevant” for 
bringing about the desired result”(Schutz 1970: 121). So if we express this 
kind of motive through the formulation “because of” we are facing the “spu-
rious because sentences” (Schutz 1970: 121).
The second form of motives is instead that of the genuine motive be-
cause. These have a different nature and concern the motives that underlie 
the determination of the dominant project. In our example, if the motive 
in order to of the action is to remove the snake, as the end of the action, the 
motive because, which is behind this end, is the fear of snakes. The genu-
ine because motives are therefore substantially different because they sink 
their roots into the experience sedimented in the foundation of knowledge 
and are not entirely available to the subject. Every because motive “has 
its autobiographical history as well, referring to many series of previously 
experienced relevances – topical, interpretational, and motivational ones 
which now ‘subconsciously’ stir the tension of my consciousness and deter-
mine the intimacy of the level of personality involved” (Schutz 1970: 122). 
The genuine because motives are not necessarily subject to the conscience. 
They are presented as a habitual possession constituted by a series of typical 
expectations present in neutralized form, but potentially actualizable when 
certain typical circumstances are verified. It is then this habitual possession 
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that activates the predominant project, present in its typical form at the bot-
tom of consciousness.10
We can note, as we did before, how Schutz should refer to the other systems 
of relevance in the analysis of a system taken separately. Before addressing the 
problem of the relationship between systems, which will be the subject of the 
next section, we must clarify the distinction between intrinsic relevances  and 
those imposed for the motivational relevances as well. Only the choice of the 
predominant project is an intrinsic motivational relevance, because only this 
choice is derived on a voluntary act. After having made the choice of the 
dominant project to be realized, all other motivational relevances will be ex-
perienced as imposed.
3.3.4 Interrelation between systems of relevance
The different systems of relevance are mutually distinguishable, but not sepa-
rable. We’ve seen during the course of our exposition: Schutz distinguishes 
three different systems and when he analyzes them individually he still must 
refer to the others. Every rupture between the systems is completely artificial. 
They show a “genuine interdependency” (Cox 1978: 91). They are therefore ex-
perienced by the subject in their absolute indivisibility; only the reflexive gaze 
can break them down. In everyday life that which is the theme is the “topic 
at hand”, not the because reasons of the action or the systems of relevance. 
Obviously, according to Schutz, even the systems of relevance can become 
thematic: we can ask ourselves why that object caught our attention, if our 
hierarchies are correct, and so on. Just as aspects of a single phenomenon, it 
is possible to choose any one of the systems of relevance as a starting point for 
the analysis.
We have already had occasion to note, when something catches our atten-
tion it becomes thematic for us, becomes a problem, a question emerges from 
the background of objects simply taken for granted. In this sense, that which 
draws attention and that which starts the interpretive process is not familiar. 
Familiarity therefore has a subjective meaning that depends both on the bi-
ography of the subject and on actual circumstances. When we encounter an 
unusual experience “What emerges as a strange experience, then, needs to 
be investigated, if it is interesting enough, because of its very unfamiliarity. It has 
become questionable. And there with new topical relevances arise” (Schutz 
1970: 132). It is the current interest that depends on the biographical and 
10  The structure of  because motives is highly complex and cannot be analyzed in detail here. 
For further reading see Muzzetto (Muzzetto 2006: 186-226).
RelevAnce AS SociAl MAtRix of Attention in AlfRed Schutz 139
current circumstances which determines the level of investigation necessary, 
or put differently, how long an object is worthy of attention. But Schutz asks, 
what then is interest? At this point it should not be difficult to answer in terms 
of motivational relevances: “Interest in this sense is the set of motivational relevances 
which guide the selective activity of my mind. These relevances may be either actual-
ly operating when I turn to an “intrinsic topic,” or they may be present as the 
sediment of relevances which were formerly actually operative in a neutral-
ized form, namely as habitual possessions of my stock of knowledge” (Schutz 
1970: 127-130). In this case, the author points out, there is a dual, bidirec-
tional relationship between thematic and motivational relevances: the inter-
est stimulated by the unusual experience generates new thematic relevances; 
these new thematic relevances in turn can be the source for new motivational 
relevances: something that did not interest me, now attracts my attention 
and I can want to familiarize myself with it. This situation in turn, can only 
change the system of interpretative relevance, “those which bear ‘subscripts’ 
as regards the main topic prevailing thus far. On the other hand, it is quite 
possible that a shift in the system of interpretational relevances – as with the 
introduction of a new concept – becomes the starting point for building up a 
set of new motivational or topical relevances which do not thus far pertain to 
the familiar stock of knowledge at hand” (Schutz 1970: 133). Therefore, it is 
not possible to attribute a priority to one of the systems of relevance: the pro-
cess is unified and therefore each system can become the starting point from 
which originate the changes in the other two.
4. Systems of relevance as social matrix of attention
Now that we have reassumed the theory of relevances in Schutz, we can in-
vestigate the relationship between attention and relevance to show precisely 
the social nature of attention. First we must try to resolve an apparent con-
tradiction. In Reflections Schutz writes that “The most critical omission made 
thus far refers to the fact that we have handled our problem – and will in this 
and the following part continue to do so – as if there were no social world at 
all, as if an isolated individual experienced the world of nature disconnected 
from his fellowmen” (Schutz 1970: 135). Does this means that for Schutz the 
idea of an isolated subject is somehow possible? If it were so, Schutz would 
not come out from the individualistic approach to attention. We must there-
fore clarify this aspect.
We must first make note of the fact that Schutz moves within a noetic 
analysis of consciousness and this necessarily influences his vision of attention 
as well. As noted, the noesi designates the experience of the object while the 
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noema is the object-as-experienced. This point is very important for the im-
plications that this choice entails: in following this perspective, attention has 
been studied mainly in relation to the subjective experiences sedimented in 
personal history. The interests and the biography of the actor function as con-
stituent elements of his attention. Quite different instead is the approach of his 
friend and colleague Aron Gurwitsch, who follows the noematic perspective. 
Gurwitsch is interested in a theory of relevances as theme-relevance while 
Schutz in a theory of ego-relevances: “With Schutz a certain item is relevant to me 
on account of the projects and pursuits which engage me. As we use the term 
relevancy, a certain item is said to be relevant to the theme (which may well be a 
plan of action or a pursuit) and also to other items because of their relevancy 
to the theme” (Gurwitsch 2010:333)11. Embree believes the two analyzes com-
patible (Embree 1977) and proposes to carefully read the difference departing 
from the diagram ego-cogito-cogitatum: Schutz is focused on the first part 
(Ego-cogito) and Gurwitsch on the second (Cogito-cogitatum). Therefore in 
following Schutz, subjective interest is necessarily emphasized as an element 
that “colors” the objects for their greater or lesser ability to attract attention. 
Interests as we have seen, must be understood in a broad sense, to include 
fears and hopes, experiences sedimented at different levels of one’s personal-
ity. Due to the noetic approach, the biography of the subject thus has a key 
role in understanding the functioning of attention. The sociologist then is in-
terested above all on the basis with which structure is determined in theme 
and horizon. However this does not mean that the analysis of Schutz remain 
caged within exclusively subjectivist explanations.
The omission of sociality primarily has the function of simplifying the 
problem treated in the analysis. The option for methodological individual-
ism implies that Schutz always starts from a subject that may possibly relate 
to another subject. However this doesn’t at all mean that the social dimen-
sion isn’t present. In The Phenomenolog y of the Social World Schutz is already 
very clear on the fact that the reality of the You and the We precedes even 
the ego as mine. This means that the experience of us that is given in the 
We-relation, in which the self and the other are physically present and inter-
acting, is a primary pre-predicative experience and “that it is only after that 
relationship is established that individuals are born into the world, even phe-
nomenologist” (Natanson 1978: 70). Intersubjectivity is the foundation of all 
other human categories: “As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity 
11  This is not the place to analyze the interesting theory developed by Gurwitsch in The Field of  
Consciousness, written at the same time as The Problem of  Relevance during the period of  greatest 
collaboration between the authors. For a recent development of  Gurwitsch’s theory we refer to 
the work that Arvidson has continued over the years particularly (Arvidson 2006).
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and the We-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of hu-
man existence” (Schutz 1957: 82). In the mundane sphere intersubjectivity 
is taken for granted, yet it is constitutively present: the world is common to 
most subjects and so my experience of it always refers to others. There is no 
subject in which society is not always present: society is an integral part of 
the individual (Schutz 1942). “Sociality, in these terms – writes Maurice Na-
tanson – is the always already existent milieu of man related to fellow man in 
multiform temporal, spatial, corporeal, as well as cognitive and emotional terms” 
(Natanson 1977: 110 emphaisis added).
Thus if the subject is always in society, and the choice of starting from an 
isolated subject has a heuristic function, any opposition between individual 
and collective is forced in the case of Schutz (Embree 1991: 210). The Aus-
trian sociologist categorically excludes the idea of  a private experience. On 
this point he is very clear in his letter to Gurwitsch of April 20, 1952 “I had 
of course only pedagogical reasons for taking a theoretical solipsistic ego as 
my point of departure and only subsequently introducing the structures which 
are involved in the social world. But that of course doesn’t mean that I believe 
that a private experience that is not socialized from the beginning is possible” (Grathoff 
1989: 177). We have also seen that sociality is always present at the cognitive 
level. If we also extend these considerations to the subject of attention, we 
must note that the treatment that provides an isolated subject that directs its 
attention towards an object is in fact a simplification. Therefore we can try to 
locate the first stable reference point of attention in Schutz, in connection with 
the framework that we have taken up in the second section. As it is for Eviatar 
Zerubavel and for Yves Citton, for Schutz attention is always socialized from 
the start. Attention is indeed an eminently social phenomenon.
We go even further in detail and see in what sense is it possible to identify 
the social dimension of attention in Schutz’s analysis of systems of relevance. 
First we will clarify the role of the systems of relevance within the stock of 
knowledge of the individual and then point out the role of the social in the 
concrete functioning of the systems of relevance.
The description of Schutz’s life-world always starts from the assumption 
that it is an intersubjective world and thus a social world. Every subject, to 
come to terms with this world, to interpret it and act in it, has available a 
stock of knowledge that is the result of the sedimentation of their previous 
experience. These are derived either from direct experience or from experi-
ences transmitted to the subject by others (peers, teachers, parents, and so on) 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 7). The stock of knowledge however does not 
consist merely of a necessarily explicit knowledge, it’s not propositional and is 
in fact intersubjective (Banega 2014). Although it has a certain unity, the stock 
is not an integrated and coherent system.
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Knowledge for Schutz is socially derived and socially distributed. The 
stock of knowledge has a intersubjective genesis: this means that a large part 
of the expectations and subjective values are learned and inherited from oth-
ers and that, consequently, only a very small part of my knowledge comes 
from direct experience (Schutz 1953: 13-14; Schutz 1976: 133-134). But not 
only: because the direct experiences are not private experiences (a hypothesis 
that, as we have seen, Schutz excludes) they are always socially mediated. In 
The Well-informed Citizen Schutz explains in detail what it means to say that the 
world is a common intersubjective world of culture: personal knowledge is in 
reference to that of the others and comes to us as an inheritance; it refers to 
a single world common to us all; and this world is subject to confirmation by 
the others (Schutz 1946).
Since the systems of relevance are also the result of sedimented experiences, 
they are a part of the stock of knowledge. However at the same time, they have 
a special position within the stock: they belong to it and they constitute some-
how its structure because they order the various elements based on the impor-
tance and appropriateness of typical situations. The systems of relevance rep-
resent the “driving force” (Hermida-Lazcano 2009) of the stock of knowledge: 
they govern its dynamics and its use. The stock of knowledge, that is, cannot 
be understood in static terms, like a warehouse from which the subject simply 
draws; it is not the subject of mere possession (Nasu 2008: 98). It is rather a 
flow that changes in the structure based on the specific situation: “It has to be 
constituted on each occasion according to the prevailing system of relevance” 
(Nasu 2006: 392). Consequently as a rule, the stock of knowledge is always 
unfinished and open: the acquisition of knowledge is never definitive, the prob-
lem always emerges within what is taken for granted. Each knowledge taken 
for granted is always subject to “new announcement” and always with respect 
to an end. For if the interpretation consists of the attribution of that which we 
have in front of us that is already noted, we can not fail to highlight the circu-
larity of the process: the new experience feeds back on the stock of available 
knowledge (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 161; Muzzetto 2006: 63). The system 
of relevance then regulates both the appropriateness of knowledge with respect 
to the concrete situation, as well as the importance of the new experience with 
respect to the stock as a whole and to the same system.
Therefore, since they are a part of the stock of knowledge, the systems of rele-
vance are also socially derived and socially distributed. Thus the ways in which 
we pay attention to objects based on the specific situation are, in large part, so-
cially derived. This approach also enables Schutz to escape the risk of sociologi-
cal determinism. Because, although it is certainly true that the systems of rel-
evance are mostly socially derived, it is also equally true that it is impossible that 
the systems of relevance are identical to its subjects. The systems of relevance 
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in fact depend ultimately on the personal history of the subject and since there 
cannot be two identical biographies, there can be no systems of relevance that 
perfectly overlap. The systems of relevance then, are socially distributed. As a 
result, not all social groups share the same matrix that guides attention. Schutz 
hasn’t particularly deepened these aspects, but we find an important indication 
in his essay on the stranger. The stranger has a hard time coming to terms with 
the new environment, not sharing the same system of relevance of the society 
in which he finds himself, he pays attention to elements the host group takes for 
granted. At the same time, he doesn’t pay attention to other elements that for 
the group are of vital importance. Ultimately, since he doesn’t have the same 
system of relevance, he has trouble identifying the pre-established alternatives 
for the appropriate definition of the situation (Nasu 2006).
The systems of relevance are socially derived and socially distributed. As 
for the former, we can say that the matrix that guides our attention has a 
social origin. The second aspect reminds us instead that not all groups and 
subjects share the same systems of relevance. Let us now move on to analyze 
the specific working methods of the systems of relevance. 
We have seen that an object12 draws our attention when it becomes a prob-
lem for us. Whether it requires our attention, or whether that attention is driv-
en by a voluntary act,13 this object becomes problematic for us and we have to 
familiarize ourselves with it. That familiarity is however a very complex con-
cept. The familiarity of an object cannot be understood in an absolute sense, 
as if it belonged to the ontological structure of the object. As we saw when we 
discussed Zerubavel, an object stands out like a figure in a background based 
on social norms. Similarly for Schutz, familiarity cannot be understood in an 
absolute sense for at least two reasons, which we’ve already discussed in previ-
ous pages. On the one hand something catches my attention depending on 
my current interest, which in turn depends both on the specific situation and 
on those experiences sedimented in my biography. On the other, the object 
that captures me is also that which is not within the typical expectations of the 
situation. But what does it mean to say that an experience is not within typical 
expectations? And how are these expectations built?
A characteristic of our habitually acquired knowledge consists in the fact 
that it typically refers to other potentially similar knowledge. Obviously, we 
12  Throughout our essay we followed Schutz and have always talked about a theme present 
in consciousness. Of  course this is a simplification, as Schutz has well presented. A theme is 
always inserted into a system, is always connected to a network of  other themes that are related 
with it.
13  Again for the sake of  clarity, as for Schutz, voluntariness does not correspond absolutely to 
the full discretionary power. The feelings that guide our will also have a social origin.
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA144
constantly experience a certain atypicality compared to what we typically 
anticipate. An experience is therefore always unusual compared with the ex-
pectations built on the basis of typically accumulated knowledge: “It is pre-
cisely this ‘not so but otherwise’ which gives the new experience the character 
of being an unfamiliar one” (Schutz 1970: 132). These expectations however, 
even though they depend on my biography, have an eminently social nature. 
The world is, according to Schutz, experienced from the beginning ac-
cording to types. This implies that for the natural attitude, the world makes 
sense, is pre-ordained, is not merely an aggregate of disordered sensations 
(Schutz 1945: 208). It also means that each typification brings with it expecta-
tions, or the ability to repeat at least in principle similar experiences: “The 
unquestioned pre-experiences are, however, also from the outset, at hand as 
typical, that is, as carrying open horizons of anticipated similar experiences. 
For example, the outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of in-
dividual unique objects, dispersed in space and time, but as “mountains,” 
“trees,” “animals,” “fellow-men” (Schutz 1953: 7-8). Typification is therefore 
an important part of the social and cultural world: this means that as typifica-
tions certainly vary between cultures, there can not exist a cultural world that 
faces less typification. As clearly stated by Barber: “Hence, typification, that 
is, typified ways of conceiving the world and typified patterns of behavior, will 
vary from one social world, or cultures, to another, but it is necessarily the 
case that if there is a socio-cultural world, then people will function within it 
by employing some set of typifications” (Barber 1987: 117). On the other hand, 
typification is essentially social, that is, socially shared, derived, transmitted 
and constantly rebuilt. Barber masterfully sums up: “For Schutz the social 
character of typification is invariant and essential such that there cannot be 
typification which do not reflect the social milieu out of which they originate 
and in which they are utilized. The social is not just accidentally affixed to 
necessary structures of typification whenever they are concretely instantiated, 
but it is intrinsically necessary to every life-world typification pattern” (Barber 
1987: 118 emphasis added). The language of common sense represents “ the 
epitome of the typifications socially approved by the linguistic group” (Schutz 
1955: 233). So for Zerubavel and Citton, as well as for Schutz the language 
guides and prestructures, predominantly at the prepredicative level, our per-
ception and attention. Typification thus becomes one of the ways through 
which the cognitive organization of the world is socially transmitted.
Therefore, if interests guide the level of knowledge required to gain respect 
from the situation and the interpretation of the world is always done in terms 
of types, according to Schutz there can be no such thing as a pure and sim-
ple type: they always originate from problems of the group. The socially ap-
proved typifications, that constitute the systems of relevance, originate in com-
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mon situations and in collective problems: “the world taken for granted by the 
in-group is a world of a common situation within which common problems 
emerges within a common horizon, problems requiring typical solutions by 
typical means for bringing about typical ends.” (Schutz 1955: 236) The expec-
tations of the subject, even if they come from direct experience, still originate 
within the scope of typifications of the membership group. Let’s take a page 
from Schutz in which he summarizes some of the issues we tried to analyze in 
this section: “The socially approved system of typifications and relevances is 
the common field within which the private typifications and relevance struc-
tures of the individual members of the group originate. This is so, because the 
private situation of the individual as defined by him is always a situation within 
the group, his private interests are interests with reference to those of the group 
(whether by way of particularization or antagonism), his private problems are 
necessarily in a context with the group’s problems” (Schutz 1955: 238).
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to highlight the contribution that the theory 
of systems of relevance of Alfred Schutz can offer to the understanding of the 
social dimension of attention. I have therefore briefly revisited some recent 
contributions that explicitly investigate intersubjective and collective atten-
tion, and we focused in particular on the proposals of Eviatar Zerubavel and 
Yves Citton. I then analyzed the role of attention in the theoretical edifice 
of Schutz, to focus on the relationship between attention and systems of rel-
evance in particular. I then tried to stress the importance of the mechanisms 
of social regulation of attention, with respect to both the origin of the systems 
of relevance as well as to their operation. Regarding the first aspect, I noted 
how for Schutz the systems of relevance are socially derived and distributed 
and are formed from sedimented experiences. With regard to their operation, 
I attempted to emphasize the elements of interest and social typification.
One of the great merits of the theory of relevance in Schutz is, as Laurent 
Perreau writes, in allowing attention to emerge as “an activity of conscious-
ness in direct contact with our practical enrollment in the world” (Perreau 
2012, 80). At the same time, the theory of systems of relevance provides the 
opportunity to read attention starting with the subject, but without tying 
it exclusively to a determinist theory of action or based solely on motives. 
Hermida-Lazcano for example, (Hermida-Lazcano 2009) sees the theory of 
relevance as an antidote to hyperrationalist theories of action for three main 
reasons: its relative concealment of projects in the consciousness, the plural-
ity of roles, and the problem of multiple realities and the schizophrenic ego. 
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Exporting these considerations to the subject of attention, we can say that for 
its relative concealment of projects my attention can also be drawn by objects 
without me fully understanding why. Perhaps for this reason it is important 
to reflect on the mechanisms through which we manage our attention, both 
individually and collectively. In an overstimulated environment it is crucial to 
cultivate our “reflexive” or “critical” attention (Citton 2014). Or to put it in 
Schutzian terms, it is essential that our systems of relevance are set to a theme. 
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